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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
authorities can do nothing which amounts in effect to the alienation of a
substantial right of the public. 47
While in the instant case it appeared that the assessments on the property
of those for whose exclusive use the property was to be maintained were well
equal to the maintenance of the property, the rule advanced by the landowners
could by a very slight variation in the situation result in a palpable injustice to
the general taxpaying population of the town.
REAL PROPERTY
Wrongful Dispossession Of Sfaufory Sub-Tenanf - No Damages
In Drinkhouse v. Parka Corporation' the Court held that a statutory tenant
did not have a cause of action for damages against a landlord who locked him out
of his apartment but, after a court injunction, offered to allow him to return if
he stipulated to abide by the ultimate decision on appeal of such injunction.
In 1951 plaintiff was a subtenant of the original tenant of defendant. When
the original tenant terminated his tenancy with defendant in June, 1951, defendant
locked plaintiff out of the apartment. In January, 1952, a declaratory judgment
with injunctive relief was granted2 declaring plaintiff to be a statutory tenant and
entitled to the protection of the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law. Defend-
ant offered to allow plaintiff to return if he stipulated to abide by the ultimate
decision on appeal of such injunction. Plaintiff refused and in a subsequent action
the Court held that defendant did not violate injunction and was not in contempt.3
Plaintiff then brought this action for damages arising during the period of time
from the original lockout in June, 1951, to the final repossession by plaintiff in
July, 1953. The complaint stated two causes of action, one for damages arising
out of the violation of the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law and the other
for treble damages in accordance with section 535 of the Real Property Law. The
Court held that since plaintiff did not state any valid causes of action defendant's
motion to dismiss under rules 112 and 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice should
have been granted.
Plaintiff is a statutory tenant and, therefore, is entitled only to that relief
47. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88 (1896).
1. 3 N.Y.2d 82, 164 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
2. Parka Corp. v. Drinkhouse, 281 App. Div. 858, 119 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st
Dep't 1953), aff'd. 305 N.Y. 885, 114 N.E.2d 430 (1953).
3. Parka Corp. v. Drinkhouse, 282 App. Div. 676, 122 N.Y.S.2d 814 (15t Dep't
1953).
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which certain statutes may prescribe. 4 Under circumstances similar to those pre-
sented above, the Emergency Housing Rent Control Law provides injunctive relief
but does not make provision for damages.5 Thus, the Court held that plaintiff did
not have a legal basis for his first cause of action. Section 535 of the Real Property
Law provides relief of treble damages for forcible entry or detainer. "Forcible"
has been defined as meaning with violence or a threat giving rise to fear of
imminent personal injury." No such forcible entry or detainer was correctly alleged
in this case. The Court did not decide whether a statutory tenant would come
within the protection of section 535, but held that even if one would, plaintiff
did not state a cause of action within it.
It appears that the Court has correctly applied the law. Nonetheless, plaintiff
would be justified in complaining of the result for he obviously suffered some
damage. However, since his only remedy is a statutory one, his complaint would
be correctly addressed to the Legislature.7
Breach Of Covenant Of Quiet Enjoyment
The covenant of quiet enjoyment has as its primary purpose the protection of
the lessee from lawful claims of third persons. It also is a promise by the lessor
that he himself will not interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of the property.8
However, interference with the lessee's possession under the power of eminent
domain does not constitute a breach of the lessor's covenant of quiet enjoyment
for the reason that parties in making the covenant were contemplating interference
by virtue of existing rights.' A covenant against eminent domain would be a
covenant not against an existing right but against a naked possibility.' 0 On the
other hand if the lessor's act brought about the interference by the public police
power, it has been held that this is a breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment
since this is interference by the lessor himself."
In Dolman v. United States Trust Company of New York,' 2 the lessor-
defendant, upon the initiative of the city agreed to give the city an option at a
certain price on any award to which defendant became entitled upon condemna-
4. Rosner v. Textile Binding and Trimming Co., 300 N.Y. 319, 90 N.E.2d 481
(1950); David v. Fayman, 298 N.Y. 669, 82 N.E.2d 404 (1948).
5. N.Y. EMERGENCY HOUSING RENT CONTROL LAW §8591.
6. Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23 (1911).
7. Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 42 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1st Dep't 1943).
8. Mayor of New York v. Mabie, 3 Kern. 151 (N.Y. 1885); Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. 9th-31 Street Corporation, 274 N.Y. 388, 9 N.E.2d 20 (1937), motion for
rcargument denied, 274 N.Y. 636, 10 N.E.2d 589 (1937).
9. Kip v. New York & .H.R.Co., 22 Sickels 227 (N.Y. 1876); Corrigan v.
Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893); Weeks v. Grace, 194 Mass. 296, 80 N.E. 220
(1907).
10. Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246 (1810).
11. Lindman v. May, 111 App. Div. 457, 97 N.Y. Supp. 821 (2d Dep't 1906).
12. 2 N.Y.2d 110, 157 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1956).
